


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
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

ENEMY SUPPLY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA THROUGH 31 MAY

Secret

June 1970



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
June 1970

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia Through 31 May

Introduction

This memorandum is the second in a series of weekly updates of an Intelligence Memorandum on enemy supply losses in Cambodia.* The analysis is based on field reporting of the first 32 days of Allied ground actions in Cambodia. The evaluation of supply losses remains tentative until the completion of current operations and the receipt of adjusted data from the field.

Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.

Supply Losses

1. From 30 April through 31 May the enemy lost about 7,360 short tons of food, weapons and equipment, and ammunition as indicated in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons</u>
Class I (food)	5,444
Classes II and IV (weapons and equipment)	233 <u>a/</u>
Class V (ammunition)	1,685
<i>Total</i>	<i>7,362</i>

a. Including 108 tons of clothing, medical supplies, communications and personal equipment, and explosives other than ammunition (last week these supplies totaled 49 tons). Excluding an estimate of 890 tons of vehicles and 30 tons of petroleum. These categories were not included in our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia and have been excluded in this analysis in order to provide comparability of data in making judgments on the drawdown of stockpiles.

The losses include 15,100 individual weapons, 2,100 crew-served weapons, 6.9 million rifle rounds, 3.2 million machinegun rounds, 45,500 mortar rounds, and 1,550 large rocket rounds. In addition, 348 vehicles have been captured in Cambodia.

Trends in Supply Losses

2. During the week ending 31 May, 1,361 tons of food, weapons, and ammunition were uncovered by Allied operations, approximately 19% of the total since operations began on 30 April. This represents a slight decrease from the daily rate of supply seizures in the previous week -- 201 tons compared with 194 tons. Total weapons and ammunition losses increased during the past week and

compared favorably with the high daily rate of seizures during the first 18 days of the Cambodian operations. Enemy food losses continued a downward trend noted previously, as shown in the following tabulation:

	<u>Short Tons per Day</u>		
	<u>30 Apr-17 May</u>	<u>18 May-24 May</u>	<u>25 May-31 May</u>
Food	184	173	132
Weapons	4	3	4
Ammunition	62	25	58
<i>Total</i>	<i>250</i>	<i>201</i>	<i>194</i>

3. Geographically, food losses in the Fishhook Area (Base Areas 352/353) and Base Areas 740 and 351 accounted for about 90% of the enemy's food losses last week. Losses in the Fishhook Area alone accounted for about one-half of the increase. Important new caches of weapons were recovered in the Parrot's Beak Area (Base Areas 706/367) and in Base Areas 351, 704, and 709. Losses in these base areas represented about 65% of last week's seizure of enemy weapons caches. Communist ammunition losses -- totaling 403 tons -- were concentrated in the Parrot's Beak and Base Area 351. These two areas accounted for about 80% of the total.

4. Operations terminated during the past week included Binh Tay I (Base Area 702), Binh Tay II (Base Area 701), and Cuu Long II (Base Area 704). This now brings to five the number of terminated operations, including the two previously reported -- Rock Crusher IV (in the Parrot's Beak Area) and Tia Chop (Base Area 354). None of the newly terminated operations accounted for a substantial portion of supply losses during the past week.

5. Enemy losses in Cambodia compared with our calculations of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia are given in the tabulation below:

Class of Supply	Short Tons		
	Estimated Enemy Stockpiles in Cambodia Apr 1970 ^{a/}	Enemy Losses in Cambodia 30 Apr-31 May	Losses as a Percent of Estimated Enemy Stockpiles
Food	6,200 - 10,370	5,444	52 - 88
Weapons and equipment	1,600 - 2,705	233	9 - 15
Ammunition	1,350 - 2,255	1,685	75 - 125
<i>Total</i>	<i>9,150 - 15,330</i>	<i>7,362</i>	<i>48 - 80</i>

a. The range in the estimates reflects the uncertainty about the size of the enemy's strategic stockpiles in Cambodia.

The captured rice represents about eight months' external resupply requirements for the enemy in southern South Vietnam. These losses are less vital than ammunition losses because they can be replaced from rice stocks in Cambodia or South Vietnam.

6. Enemy weapons losses increased substantially during the past week; although when compared with estimated stockpiles in Cambodia these losses remain relatively unimportant. Weapons losses in Cambodia are equal to only about 29% of enemy weapons losses in South Vietnam last year. They are more impressive, however, when viewed from the perspective of the requirements of an enemy battalion. Weapons captures have been enough to arm 32 full-strength infantry battalions. Furthermore, preliminary reports indicate that most of the weapons captured have been serviceable, the 1st Cavalry Division G-4 estimating that approximately 95% of SKS rifles taken by the division were in operating condition. A recently found cache, considered representative, contained approximately 2,000 individual weapons, of which 1,200 were SKS rifles. One thousand of these were in good condition, packed in cosmoline, and securely boxed and crated. Only 60 were found to be damaged to the extent that they were unserviceable.

7. The weapons losses, however, will not seriously degrade enemy capabilities in South Vietnam. Interrogation reports and captured documents do not reflect significant weapons shortages in Viet Cong or North Vietnamese units in South Vietnam. Most infantry units are well equipped with the new family of Soviet and Communist Chinese 7.62-mm small arms -- the AK 47 assault rifle, SKS carbine, and the RPD light machinegun. Moreover, if SKS rifles constitute a large portion of captured small arms, the significance of these losses is reduced because the AK 47 rifle is the preferred individual arm. Its range is about the same as the SKS, but its practical rate of fire is higher, its magazine capacity greater, and it can be fired both automatically and semiautomatically. The large numbers of SKS rifles that have been captured suggest that these weapons have been stored in Cambodia for an extended period because we would expect newly emplaced weapons caches to have a higher concentration of AK 47s.

8. Our analysis of the field data now indicates that the enemy has lost ammunition equivalent to 75%-125% of the estimated stockpiles in Cambodia.* Expenditure data indicate that the losses have been appreciable for some categories of ammunition but less impressive for others. Losses of small arms ammunition represent the equivalent of about three to four months' expenditure of this type of ammunition by enemy forces in South Vietnam during 1969.

9. Losses of large rocket and mortar rounds constitute the equivalent of two and five months' of expenditures in South Vietnam, respectively, during 1969. However, the ratio of the expenditure of mortar to large rocket rounds in South Vietnam during 1969 was 11:1, and losses of these

* The tonnage allocated to ammunition losses is calculated on the basis of an average weight for fairly broad categories of ammunition. When more specific data are received from the field on the quantities of each type of ammunition captured, these tonnages may be revised considerably.

types of ammunition in Cambodia have been in the ratio of 29:1. Thus, as stated in our earlier memorandums, we believe that the enemy may still have large quantities of rockets stored in Cambodia.

10. Very large quantities of recoilless rifle ammunition have been seized in Cambodia. This category of ammunition accounts for about 30% of the total mortar, large rocket, and recoilless rifle ammunition captured in Cambodia. By contrast, recoilless rifle ammunition equals only 4% of the estimated expenditures of these three categories of ammunition in South Vietnam, suggesting either that the Communists have stockpiled unusually large amounts of recoilless ammunition or that the intelligence community has been sharply underestimating the enemy's expenditures of this type of ammunition.

11. Ammunition losses in South Vietnam by type for 1969 are compared with losses to date in Cambodia in the following tabulation:

	<u>South Vietnam</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Cambodia/ South Vietnam (Percent)</u>
Small arms	12,403,000	6,899,000	56
Large rockets	4,000	1,550	39
Small rockets	70,000	25,200	36
Mortars	190,000	45,500	24
Grenades	149,000	34,700	23
Recoilless rifles	17,300	21,600	125


Losses of small arms ammunition in Cambodia are currently about 56% of such losses sustained in South Vietnam last year. As indicated previously, losses of ammunition for recoilless rifles have been exceptionally high and are presently 125% of comparable losses in South Vietnam. Other losses of ammunition have ranged between one-fourth and two-fifths of the comparable losses in South Vietnam last year.

12. Incomplete reporting from the field regarding captured enemy vehicles precludes a

thorough analysis of the makes, types, and sizes captured from the Communist forces. As of the end of May, 348 enemy vehicles reportedly were captured by Allied forces, with more than 82% of these being found in the Fishhook Area and Base Area 351. However, daily field cables on Allied operations in Cambodia during this period, presumably incomplete, mention only 150 motorized four-wheel vehicles that have been captured or destroyed. Of this total, about 100 were further identified, as shown in the following tabulation:

One-quarter ton trucks	14
One-half ton trucks	38
Three-quarter ton trucks	18
One and one-half ton trucks	6
Two and one-half ton trucks	26
Jeeps and land rovers	5

Total 107



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18. A combination of heavy rains and bombing is beginning to take its toll of the Panhandle roadnet. Increased difficulty was noted in maintaining roads and artillery positions as rains caused flooding, landslides, and collapsed fortifications, particularly in the western DMZ area. Nevertheless, the Panhandle roadnet is still largely serviceable for vehicle traffic and is being maintained.

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Summary

19. US and South Vietnamese forces have captured 7,360 tons of supplies during the first 32 days of operations in Cambodia. About 74% of the enemy losses in the present Cambodia operations consist of food, about 23% ammunition, and the remainder of weapons and equipment. Supply losses of all classes are estimated at from about 50% to 80% of the stockpiles estimated to have been in Cambodia at the start of Allied operations.

20. The rate of supply captures slackened somewhat this past week -- from an average of nearly 250 tons daily during 30 April-17 May, to 200 tons during 18-24 May, and to about 195 tons during 25-31 May. However, important new weapons and ammunition caches continued to be discovered.

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22. Heavy rains and bombing are making the task of transporting supplies in the Panhandle increasingly difficult. Nevertheless, the Panhandle logistic system is intact and functioning.


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Cumulative Results of US and ARVN Operations in Cambodia
(as of 31 May 2000 Hours EDT)

Supply Item	Parrot's Beak	Fish-hook	Base Areas					Terminated Operations <u>a/</u>	Total
			740	351	350	704/709	704		
Individual weapons	1,455	4,536	574	2,053	271	2,547	271	3,395	15,102 <u>b/</u>
Crew-served weapons	398	645	132	295	29	131	12	441	2,083 <u>b/</u>
Rice (tons)	763	2,571	411	655	58	43	17	926	5,444
Vehicles	24	205	22	81	2	8	0	6	348
Ammunition (tons)	390	311	20	698	25	25	12	204	1,685

a. Terminated operations include Rock Crusher IV, Tia Chop (BA 354), Binh Tay I (BA 702), Binh Tay II (BA 701), and Cuu Long II (BA 704).
b. Represents the loss of about 125 tons of arms.

VC/NVA Base Areas Along Cambodian Border



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